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INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE:
FINNISH UNIVERSITY INTELLIGENTSIA AND ITS GERMAN IDEALISM
TRADITION
The article examines the making of the Finnish intelligentsia and its relation to the state and the
nation. The problem is analysed primarily from the perspective of student activism in the twentieth
century. The development is viewed in the context of nationalism, (cultural) modernism, and
radicalism in the development of the public sphere. The main source consists of the research
findings of the student magazine Ylioppilaslehti (Student Magazine), which is not just “any student
paper,” but a Finnish institution that has seen most of Finland’s cultural and political elite pass
through its editorial staff in the twentieth century. The article demonstrates the importance of
German idealism, as theorised by the Finnish statesman and philosopher J.W. Snellman, and its
vital role in the activities of the Finnish university intelligentsia well into the 21st century.
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INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE:
FINNISH UNIVERSITY INTELLIGENTSIA AND ITS GERMAN IDEALISM
TRADITION
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, there has been quite a fuss around Finnish philosopher Pekka Himanen in the Finnish
public sphere. Himanen is internationally known as the researcher of the information age – together
with Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells, for instance. The discussion started when the
investigative web journal Long Play published an article1 about Himanen in February 2012. The
article questioned Himanen’s academic competence but also revealed the close relationship between
Himanen and Prime Minister of Finland Jyrki Katainen. Himanen had received an assignment to
make a future account for Finland – a model for sustainable growth. It looked as if the Prime
Minister had inappropriately used his influence on the process in which three major Finnish
governmental research funding institutions had been forced to support Himanen’s proposal without
soliciting the submission of alternate proposals, as is the customary practice. Himanen was called,
among other things, the “Prime Ministers’s best friend”.
This assignment was not the first one awarded to Himanen. The previous government of Finland,
where Katainen was Minister of Finance, had ordered a future account of how the Finnish culture
would blossom in the 2010s. The analysis, published as a book in March 2010, was titled
1 See http://longplay.fi/himasen_etiikka/
4
Kukoistuksen käsikirjoitus2 (The Script for Blossoming). The book received reviews ranging from
modest commentaries to brickbats. The objects of criticism were several, but one theme, mentioned
especially by other philosophers, concerned Himanen’s role as a “state philosopher”: you cannot be
a “free philosopher” and write blue books for the state at the same time!
However, there were clear precedents for Himanen’s assignment in contemporary Finnish history.
In 1993, Prime Minister Esko Aho asked philosopher and later Chancellor of the University of
Helsinki Ilkka Niiniluototo to assemble a working group tasked with providing an accounting of the
mental state and the future of Finland. The results were published as a book3 as well. One of the few
independent or “free” Finnish intellectuals, writer Erno Paasilinna, criticised the working group in
1996, remarking that intelligentsia should be always in opposition, and they could not be whistled
to like a dog at some Prime Minister’s beck and call.4
The connection between the intelligentsia and the state can also be found in other countries in recent
years. One of the most famous examples is British sociologist Anthony Giddens being an adviser to
the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.  His “third way” political approach was Blair’s
guiding political idea. However, strong ties between the State and intellectuals have long historical
roots, especially in Finland. In general, the intellectuals in Nordic countries have never really
become an alienated stratum with an independent tradition vis-à-vis the state. Intellectuals in Nordic
countries have often been used in the service of society. Hence rather than remaining in the
marginal avant-garde, they have been at the centre of society.5 This does not fit the preconceptions
which assume that to call a person an intellectual is to suggest that in some basic way he or she
2 Pekka Himanen, Kukoistuksen käsikirjoitus (Helsinki, 2010).
3 Ilkka Niiniluoto and Paavo Löpponen, eds., Suomen henkinen tila ja tulevaisuus (Porvoo, 1993).
4 Pertti Karkama and & Hanne Koivisto (1997), “Sivistyneistö ja älymystö Suomessa” In P. Karkama and A. Koivisto,
eds., Älymystön jäljillä. Kirjoituksia suomalaisesta sivistyneistöstä ja älymystöstä. Tietolipas 151, (Helsinki, 1997), 9.
5 Ron Eyerman, “Intellectuals and the State: A Framework for Analysis, with Special Reference to the United States
and Sweden”, in N. Kauppi and P. Sulkunen, eds., Vanguard of Modernity. Society, Intellectuals, and the University,
Publications of the research unit for contemporary culture 32, (University of Jyväskylä, 1992), 73.
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stands against or apart from the contemporary dominant culture. Intellectuals have been in the habit
of questioning and challenging values and assumptions that were taken for granted in their
societies.6
When intellectual historian Ron Eyerman refers to the “intelligentsia,” he means the historically
specific stratum that “forms a social category which takes form in varying social and cultural
contexts in relation to norms and traditions reaching back to pre-industrial society. Intellectuals are
first of all that social category which performs the task of making conscious and visible the
fundamental notions of a society.” The concept of “intelligentsia” was formed in Eastern Europe
(Russia and Poland) in the early nineteenth century, and the state was its ally. But since then the
concept has had many variations.7
In Finland, the university intellectuals and the state have lived in symbiosis in an extraordinary way.
This relation is illustrated more clearly than perhaps in any other country on Helsinki Senate
Square: the university and the senate are situated opposite each other in similar buildings, the only
difference being the university’s Ionic colonnade as Hellas and the Senate’s Corinthian colonnade
as Rome. Another manifesting symbol of this alliance in the University of Helsinki can be found
inside the University building. On the wall of the Great Hall there is a painting depicting the
inaugural procession of the University in July 1640 in Turku, where the University was located until
1828. The central figure in the picture is not a university man, but a representative of the
government — Count Per Brahe, the true founder of the University, who at that time was Governor
6 See e.g. Lewis S. Feuer, ”What is an Intellectual?” in Aleksander Gella, ed., The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals:
Theory, Method and Case Study (Los Angeles, CA, 1976), 48; Seyrmor Martin Lipset and Asoker Basu , ”The Roles of
the Intellectual and Political Roles”, in Aleksander Gella, ed., The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuas: Theory, Method
and Case Study (Los Angeles, CA, 1976), 112.
7 See e.g. Ron Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics. Intellectuals in Modern Society, (Cambridge, 2004), 6 (citation),
16–31.
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General of Finland. Power and learning have traditionally been closely allied in Finland. University
professors dominated not only the intellectual but also the political field in Finland until the Second
World War. 8
Although the link between elites and the stratum of intelligentsia is not automatic, cultural, political,
bureaucratic, and other elites can be conceived as composing part of a whole called the
intelligentsia.9 In this article, I discuss the role of a Finnish intellectual from the viewpoint of
student and other intellectual activism in the twentieth century. I look at intellectuals both from the
phenomenological point of view, i.e. the self-understanding and perceptions of the individual, and
from the structural point of view, which takes as its starting point an objective, observable position
in the social structure.10 “Objective,” of course, means meeting the standards of a given historical
society. In any case, the emphasis is on the latter approach.11
I am particularly interested in the making of the Finnish intelligentsia and its relation to the state
and the nation. I look at the development in the context of nationalism, (cultural) modernism, and
radicalism in the development of the public sphere. The aim is not, however, to provide a full “total
historian” account of Finnish intellectual history, but to extract a few examples of the long durée of
the relationship between the Finnish university intellectuals and the State through historical turmoil.
The main source consists of the research findings12 of the student magazine Ylioppilaslehti (Student
8 Matti Klinge (1992) “Intellectual Tradition in Finland”, in N. Kauppi and P. Sulkunen, eds., Vanguard of Modernity.
Society, Intellectuals, and the University, Publications of the research unit for contemporary culture 32, (University of
Jyväskylä, 1992), 41; Anto Leikola, “In Sercvice of the Truth or of the Emperor. Some reflections on the loyalties of the
University of Finland”, in M. Norrback and K. Ranki, ed., University and Nation: The University and the Making of the
Nation in Northern Europe in the 18th and 20th Centuries, Studia Historica (Helsinki, 1996), 125.
9 Peter C. Ludtz, ”From methdological Problems in Comparative Studies of the Intelligentsia”, in Aleksande Gella, ed.,
The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuas: Theory, Method and Case Study (Los Angeles, CA, 1976), 37.
10 Ron Eyerman and Lennart G. Svensson and Thomas Söderqvist ‚“Introduction“ in R. Eyerman and L. G. Svensson
and T. Söderqvist Intellectuas, eds., Universities and the State in Western Societies (London, 1987), 3.
11 I have analysed the particular ways of thinking and acting of the Finnish student leaders more in other contexts. See
Jukka Kortti, “Generations and Media History” In L. Fortunati and F. Colombo, eds., Broadband Society and
Generational Changes, Series: Participation in Broadband Society - Volume 5, (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern,
Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2011), 69–93.
12 Jukka Kortti, Ylioppilaslehden vuosisata, (Helsinki, 2013).
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Magazine), which is not just “any student paper,” but a Finnish institution that has seen most of
Finland’s cultural and political elite pass through its editorial staff in the 20th century.
THE SNELLMANIAN PATRIMONY
The role of intellectuals in society is dependent on the possibilities and the constraints provided by
both tradition and context. The social conditions and political beliefs, as well as relations to wider
social movements, fashion intellectuals in different cultures and in different times. 13 In Finland, the
tradition of the intelligentsia is highly influenced by one person, J. V. Snellman (1806–1881). In his
early career, the philosopher and statesman was deeply influenced by the main philosophical trend
of the 1840s, Hegelianism. Snellman laid the intellectual foundations of the Finnish state in his
Lärän om Staten (The Idea of the State) in 1842, in which he promoted the idea of the authority of
the state at the expense of the more liberal civil society.
Snellman absorbed the Hegelian ideas of the superiority of the state and patriotism through his
teacher J. J. Tengström in the 1830s. Tengström went even further than his master Hegel by stating
that selfish individuality, even produced by Weltgeist (the spirit) according to Hegelian thinking, is
bad for the status quo and tradition. Tengström emphasised the role of civil servants who had to be
rational, ethical (Sittlichkeit), and devote themselves to the citizens and the fatherland. The lectures
of Tengström had far-reaching consequences for Snellman and other Finnish followers of German
idealism, because the construction provided the possibility for the Finnish intelligentsia to identify
with the state. Following the ideas of Tensgström, Snellman emphasised national cultural identity
and linguistic nationalism as the essence of a sovereign state. In that sense, he followed the ideas of
J.G. von Herder rather than Hegel, especially when placing emphasis on language. For Snellman,
13 Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics, 3.
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language — especially its vocabulary — was not just an external medium for people to
communicate their thoughts to each other, but something to express the common experience of a
nation and a specific way of understanding the world. As a one example of his view, he claimed that
that the Grand Duchy of Finland, which was a part of the Russian Empire from 1809 to 1918, was
on a higher developmental level than the independent state of Switzerland, where the national spirit
seemed to be sleeping due to the multiethnic, multilingual character of that country. We can also
find the influences of the language philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt in Snellman’s thinking.14
Bildung (education) was also an essential concept in Snellman’s thinking and action. His conception
of the university was based on it: the university was both for advancing science and for training in
moral and ethical living. Primarily, the aim of a university education was not just for providing
degrees, offices, or salary. In this sense, the views of Snellman have been seen in the classical
Humboldtian or neo-humanistic15 frame of reference, in which the freedom of research, teaching
and studying is a central, intrinsic value. But this academic freedom of the university, especially
after Snellman finally became a professor in 1856, developed into an implement for organizing the
functions of the state. The schools should educate people for the civil society, and the university,
again, for the service of the state. But the university cannot be like a school. For Snellman, the
essence of academic studies was the pursuit of knowledge and ethical life that arises from
recognition of the rights of self-consciousness. This is Snellman’s justification for the principle of
academic freedom. As a Hegelian, he believed, more than his master actually, that the ethical life of
the state is mediated by subjectivity. In Snellman’s thinking, a citizen’s loyalty should be, in the
14 Marja Jalava, J. V. Snellman. Mies ja suurmies. (Helsinki, 2003), 40–4, 117–8.
15 Actually the Humboldtian ideas were part of a wider historical and cultural movement in the context of the
sentimental turn of the late Enlightenment followed by neo-humanism and romanticism as well as the increasing power
of the absolutist state and the growths of a bureaucratic intelligentsia. See e.g. David Sorkin, “Wilhelm Von Humboldt:
The Theory and Practice of Self-Formation (Bildung), 1791-1810” Journal of the History of Ideas, 44, 1 (1983), 55-73.
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first place, loyalty to the nation, in the framework of which the individual personality could achieve
fulfilment.16
As the scholars of nationalism have stated, nationalism can be seen as “civic religion” for a young,
“ahistorical nation.” It has also been a suitable ideology for the elite to persuade common people to
identify with a modern state.17 In this tradition, Finland belongs to Western rather than Eastern
Europe, where nationalism has been a liberating force for an oppressed people.18
EDUCATING STATE BUREUCRATS FOR THE GRAND DUCHY OF FINLAND
The Finnish view, however, was dissimilar to the former mother country of Sweden.19 The Swedes
acknowledged, in the spirit of moderate liberalism, that people have many rightful orientations,
which are not commensurable, but compete with each other. However, in the Grand Duchy of
Finland, the circumstances favoured consensus. The Finnish intelligentsia had to concentrate on the
development of the state in contrast to old European nation-states, in which the mental resources
could be directed to multiple orientations. Especially in its difficult political situation as a part of
absolutistic Russia, the Finnish university system could not fully provide a free forum for
intellectual activity.
Yet Finland was allowed to retain most of the important institutions under Russian rule. First of all,
local government – the Imperial Senate of Finland since 1816 – remained much as it had been under
16 Jalava, J. V. Snellman, 54–61; Juha Manninen, “Academic Freedom” in Semi-Ramistic Studies: Essays in Honour of
Raimo Tuomela, Report from the Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, 5/1980, (Helsinki 1980), 22–31;
Leikola, “In Service of the Truth or of the Emperor”, 128.
17 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London, 1964), 164-72; Eric Hobsbawm, “Some Reflections on Nationalism”,
in T.J. Nossiter & A.H. Hanson & Stein Rokkan (eds.), Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences (London,
1972, 395-401.
18 See Risto Alapuro, Suomen älymystö Venäjän varjossa (Helsinki, 1997), 17-22.
19 Finland was a part of the kingdom of Sweden from the Middle Ages until 1809 when – after the Napoleonic Wars – it
became an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire.
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Sweden, although its powers were rather circumscribed. Another important institution, the
University, was reformed and named after the Tsar20 as Imperial Alexander University after it
moved from Turku to Helsinki in 1828. The Senate effectively took education under its wing, and
the University became first and foremost an institution to educate bureaucrats to serve the State.
The Finnish settlement was not unique in Russian history21, but Finland maintained its special status
and was able to develop a political and cultural autonomy during the nineteenth century which
resulted in full independence after the Russian revolution.
Alexander I, who declared that Finland should take its place “in the rank of nations, governed by its
own laws” including religion and customs, was considered to be a liberal in the climate of
contemporary Europe. His successor Nicholas I was more of a paternal autocrat than a spiritual and
intellectual Tsar as was his brother. He put an end to several areas of local autonomy including
Poland in 1830, but Finland was able keep its autonomy partly due to Finnish loyalty. However, his
successor Alexander II, ‘The Good Tsar’, was a real reformer, and Finland became sort of a
laboratory to test his reforming ideas. Actually, Russia was economically backward compared to
Finland. When the Emperor granted relatively wide freedom for its “overdeveloped” province22,
most of the mutual benefit favoured Finland. Especially for the growth of the forest industry – the
footing for the Finnish economy until the late twentieth century before Nokia and other high tech
clusters – the big Russian markets were extremely important. Alexander II established Finland’s
own currency and liberated business, but also encouraged Finns to elevate Finnish to a national
language.
20 Finnish Diet recognized Tsar Alexander I as Grand Duke.
21 The Baltic provinces also retained some of their former institutions, and in 1815 the Congress of Vienna agreed to the
formation of a Kingdom of Poland as an internal autonomy of Russian sovereignty. But later in the nineteenth century
Poland was treated as an occupied territory and the Baltic Provinces were incorporated into the Russian system of
government.
22 Only Croatia, Bohemia and the Polish parts of Russia could be compared to Finland as relatively overdeveloped
countries in the contemporary Russian Empire. (Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (London, 1977), 120.
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However, Russians allowed Finnish bureaucrats to work relatively independently only insofar as
Finland offered a model for efficiency and good administration for the rest of Russia. When
situations changed in the mid-nineteenth century along with the rising nationalism in Europe as well
as in the Russian provinces, the new generation of Finnish elite such as Snellman started to forge
Finnish statehood in a different manner. However, it did not mean revolution, as in Poland, but new
manoeuvres behind the scenes to win the emperor’s approval. For instance, in the European
Revolutions of 1848, which arose from a wide variety of causes linked to modernisation
(ideologies, technological change, and urbanisation), the students went to barricades in Central
Europe, but the Finnish students spent their spring day celebration by hurrahing for the Emperor.
Historically, Finns have been relatively moderate in protesting. In addition, demonstrations and
protest marches have characteristically been orderly and organized23. Overall, it is somewhat
unusual that activists of a nationalistic movement were actually co-opted into the bureaucracy.
MODERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE
On the other hand, Finland was experiencing a slow modernisation process during almost the entire
nineteenth century. When modernisation is rapid, the arenas of society and culture diverge from
each other and lay the groundwork for oppositional intelligentsia. In fact, the whole concept of the
“intellectual” is a child of Enlightenment and reaction, supporting or opposing modernism.24
Overall, the modern concept of intellectuals entered European culture in connection with the so-
called Dreyfus affair at the turn of the 20th century.25 To be an intellectual meant autonomy —
23 See Alapuro, Suomen älymystö Venäjän varjossa, 28-54.
24 Jalava, J. V. Snellman,  47–48; Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics, 27; Hanne Koivisto, “Ihmisryhmä, jossa
moraali ja äly yhtyvät: intellektuellin käsitteestä”, in L. Rossi & H. Koivisto, eds., Monta tietä menneisyyteen, (Turun
yliopisto, 1995).
25 The Dreyfus affair was a political scandal that divided France in the 1890s and the early 1900s. Captain Alfred
Dreyfus, a young French artillery officer of Alsatian Jewish descent, had been falsely declared guilty of leaking security
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distance from the corridors of power. But by then the intellectuals were already divided into two
camps. In addition to the liberals in defence of Dreyfus, there were also conservative defendants of
national values, the army, and established social hierarchy. In universities particularly, this division
was defined as the degree to which individuals were bound to legitimate social structures within and
outside university. Some, mostly representing humanities and modernism, were more autonomous
and likely to choose the universalist liberal camp, while more traditional sciences, dependent more
on the state, went to the conservative camp. All in all, the Dreyfuss Affair helped to solidify
intellectuals as intelligentsia. Now they could function as a distinct group in society with a moral
mission against the established authority.26
Although the French case was unique, explained by the tradition and the structure of the Parisian
elite, the same kind of movement can be found in other parts of Europe as well. In Finland, the
modernisation process forged ahead in the late nineteenth century. One of its features was that the
traditional social order of the four estates and the ecclesiastic regulation system started to shatter.
The traditional customs and mores as well as the attributes of social status were called into question.
If we approach this development from the point of view of subjective modernity and consider not
only linear goal-orientation, but also multidimensional fragmentation, it meant changes in the
identity of an individual. The selfhood and identity became relatively loose, and “self” was now
seen as a reflexive project. But still, this was done in the tradition of German Idealism. As the
Finnish intellectual historian Marja Jalava, who has studied this change through the Finnish liberal
moral philosopher Rolf Lagerborg, has put it, the main question and problem concerned the relation
between Sittlichkeit (morality) and Sinnlichkeit (sensuality) and their “reconciliation”
information to Germans. When Emile Zola, man of letters, reproached the government for denying Dreyfus his right to
justice, several public figures joined to support Zola. The term intellectual appeared a couple of days later in a
newspaper article referring to Zola and his associates. ‘Intellectuals’ not only became a term in popular use, but has a
sarcastic connotation at first. (see e.g. Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics, 53-67.)
26 Pekka Sulkunen, “The formation of intellectuals as social group” in N. Kauppi and P. Sulkunen, eds., Vanguard of
Modernity. Society, Intellectuals, and the University, Publications of the research unit for contemporary culture 32,
(University of Jyväskylä, 1992), 9; Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics, 38.
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(Versöhung).27 Lagerborg was distinctively a Swedish-speaking28 university intellectual – an
aristocrat, who was not only liberal but also internationally oriented. But internationality and
liberalism attracted the Finnish-speaking intelligentsia as well.
The period aroused liberalism, but also cultural criticism and the first Finnish modernists in
literature. Especially after the nationalistic Fennoman movement29 divided in two, the liberal writers
of this group of “Young Finns” wanted to “open windows” to Europe. For the first time, the Finnish
intelligentsia was centred in the circles of artists, men of letters, and journalists instead of students
or politicians. Especially men of letters (authors, poets, writers, journalists) such as Juhani Aho and
Eino Leino, who later became the Great Men of Finnish literature, resembled the archetype of a
French intellectual. They were academic, travelling, language-skilled individuals— virtual
renaissance figures, who knew art circles and were interested in different kinds of social, political
and cultural topics. The resemblance to France was not accidental, however, since Juhani Aho even
wrote articles about the Dreyfus affair, for instance.30
Those Finnish international liberals ran into trouble after Nicholas II came into power. He initiated
processes that have been called “the Russification of Finland.” Especially after General Nikolay
Bobrikov became governor-general of Finland, he started a reform aiming to control Russian’s
western borderland. This meant the strengthening of his own powers, the integration of the armed
forces, the abolition of separate customs and monetary systems, and the introduction of Russian into
27 Marja Jalava, Minä ja maailmanhenki. Moderni subjekti kristillis-idealistisessa kansallisajattelussa ja Rolf
Lagerborgin kulttuuriradikalismissa n. 1800–1914. Bibliotheca Historica 98, (Helsinki, 2005), 463 (English summary).
28 The Swedish-speakers started to move to the west coast of Finland in the Middle Ages. Finland became part of the
Kingdom of Sweden in the twelfth century. The original mother-tongue of people living in Finland was Finnish except
that on the coast there were Swedish-speakers. However, Swedish became the language of the administration and a
great many inhabitants of Finland adopted Swedish as their cultural language, and the upper classes also spoke Swedish
at home. After Finland became the Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire in 1809, Swedish remained the official
language of the country.
29 The Fennomans were the most important political movement in the Grand Duchy of Finland in the 19th century. The
movement pushed to raise the Finnish language and Finnic culture – distance from Swedish or Scandinavian culture –
from its peasant-status to the position of a national language and national culture.
30 Koivisto, “Ihmisryhmä, jossa moraali ja äly yhtyvät”, 120–1.
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the Senate, civil service, and schools. This policy, established in 1899, and often referred to as the
“February Manifesto,” eventually became known (in Finnish contemporary and subsequent
literature) as the beginning of the first “icy times” and “oppression” (1899-1905). Borbikov was
assassinated by Eugen Schauman, a nationalist and nobleman, in 1904. Later there was another
Russification period (1908-1917) which lasted until the Russian revolution.
The Young Finns, who separated from the more conservative Finnish Party, strongly opposed
Russification on a constitutional basis. The roots of the movement (political party 1905-1918) were
in the art circles of the late nineteenth century. Besides Aho and Leino, there were other major
cultural figures of the “Golden Age of Finnish Art” such as authors Minna Canth and Ilmari Kianto,
painters Akseli Gallen-Kallela and Pekka Halonen, and the composer Jean Sibelius. From these
circles was established the newspaper Päivälehti. One of the founders and later the editor-in-chief
and the owner of the paper, Eljas Erkko, who was also the founder and leader of the Young Finns
Party, was exiled by Bobrikov and spent the years 1903-1905 in the United States and Cuba.
Meanwhile Päivälehti was disbanded after it wrote positively about Schauman’s assassination but
started again as Helsingin Sanomat31 in the same year. Later in independent Finland, Erkko worked
as a Minister for two Finnish governments. Of the other Young Finns politicians, P.E. Svindhuvud,
the third President of Finland32 (1931-37), was exiled to Siberia during the First World War because
he refused to obey the rules requiring the replacement of Finnish officials with Russians.
Hence if we look at the relations of certain factions of Finnish intellectuals to mother Russia in the
late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the loyalty to the superior State was broken.
Compliance politics was questioned along with the wider unrest in the Russian Empire and world
politics. This development led to the declaration of independence (1917) and the Finnish Civil War
31 Nowadays, Helsingin Sanomat  is the biggest newspaper in the Nordic countries.
32 The movement provided a background for two other later Presidents of Finland, K.J. Ståhlberg (1919-25) and Risto
Ryti (1940-44) as well.
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(1918).33 The Finnish Civil War had a crucial influence on every intellectual activity, especially
during the interwar period. For the major faction of young intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s, the
Civil War meant a “formative experience.”34
ERA OF STUDENT NATIONALISM
One of the forums for these Finnish-speaking liberals was the magazine Nuori Suomi (Young
Finland) published between 1905 and 1907. It was a sort of predecessor for Ylioppilaslehti, which
was established in 1913. During its first years, Ylioppilaslehti was mainly a “professional magazine
for students” and it reflected the general non-political sentiments of the student world. However, the
situation changed in the 1920s. The activities of the university students concentrated specifically on
the Academic Karelian Society (AKS). The first institution, which the AKS took over within
student circles in 1923, was Ylioppilaslehti. The AKS35 was an extreme right-wing student
movement founded in the previous year. The organisation was unfavourable to liberalism,
pluralism, socialism and communism, stock jobbing, foreigners, urbanity and “snobbery.” It had a
strong generational hegemony among the students, especially in the 1930s.
33 The Finnish Civil War between the revolutionary Red Guards and Civil Guards started on 27/28 January and ended
on 15 May 1918. The War can be seen both as a part of the Russian Revolution and the First World War. After Finland
won its independence from Russia in 1917, the radical faction of the Social Democrats started a revolution. The Reds
were supported by the Russian Soviet Republic, whereas the non-socialist Whites received military assistance from
the German Empire. The Whites saw the war first and foremost as the liberation from Russia. The Whites finally won
the bloody and bitter war, but the traumatic and controversial shadows of the war have followed the Finnish people
from generation to generation.
34 The idea of “formative experience” comes from the German sociologist and generation theorist Karl Mannheim.
According to him, the age of seventeen is important for later development, and he states: “The possibility of really
questioning and reflecting on things only emerges at the point where personal experimentation with life begins.” (Karl
Mannheim, “The problem of generations”, in P.G. Altbach and R. S. Laufer, eds., The new pilgrims: youth protest in
transition (New York, 1972), 115). Most of the young Finnish activists of the interwar period were born around 1900.
35 The association emerged from the revenge-spirited Karelian idea. The original idea was to get back the Eastern
Karelian territory ceded to Soviet Russia in the “Shame Treaty” of Tartu. According to the treaty, Finnish troops were
to be withdrawn from two large border parishes of East Karelia, Repola and Porajärvi, which had been occupied by
Finnish troops since 1918 – after Finland became independent from Russia in 1917.
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Despite the fact that the AKS activists were on the winning Whites’ side of the Civil War, the
leaders of the movement still wanted to integrate the working population into their ideal society in
the 1920s. The situation changed when the movement split and the remaining faction started flirting
with fascism in the 1930s. After that, the workers36 had no role in the movement. AKS joined with
the fascist-minded People’s Patriotic Movement (IKL), which was run by the older academic
intellectuals.37
In any case, the radical nationalism was nothing new among the university students. The core idea
of the Fennoman movement, which came into existence from within the Swedish-speaking elite in
the early nineteenth century, was to educate the nation, inspire nationalism among educated people
and promote the status of the Finnish language. By the 1840s, Snellman had already become the
great master of the Fennoman students.38
Among the university students, the ethno-linguistic conflict had moved into a stalemate during the
first years of the twentieth century. However, the situation changed after Finland won its
independence. The topic which troubled the University of Helsinki the most in the 1920s and 1930s,
was the language struggle – the issue of “finnicizing” the university.39
36 Unlike Sweden, for example, Finland almost completely lacked the cultural left in the inter-war period – mainly
because the communist party was illegal in Finland until 1944.
37 See Risto Alapuro, Akateeminen Karjala-Seura. Ylioppilasliike ja kansa 1920- ja 1930-luvulla.Politiikan tutkimuksia
14, (Helsinki, 1973.
38 In the 1860s and the 1870s, their propaganda also led to the establishment of the Swede-Finn national movement,
which already included at that time the idea of giving Swedish speakers their own separate national identity. The
Finnish national movement gradually evolved into a class movement, reflecting the division of the Diet into four
estates: nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants. Finnish speakers had an edge over clergy and peasants. Swedish was
first and foremost the language of the upper class. In the 1880s, there was an extreme radical student fraction called
K.T.P., which pushed forward with the total hegemony of Finnishness. See e.g. Ilkka Liikanen, Fennomania ja kansa .
Joukkojärjestäytymisen läpimurto ja Suomalaisen puolueen synty, (Helsinki, 1995);  Ilkka Liikanen. Aira Kemiläinen,
Finns in the Shadow of the “Aryans”. Race Theories and Racism, Studia Historica 59 (Helsinki, 1998), 107-128.
Particularly about the radical nationalism among the Finnish university students in the late nineteenth century, see e.g.
Matti Klinge, K.T.P:stä jääkäreihin. Ylioppilaskunnan historia II, 1872-1917, (Helsinki, 1978).
39 The language struggle was in fact one of the two dominating topics in Ylioppilaslehti in the 1930s, the other one
being the relationships with Estonia based on the “kindred spirit” – the idea of one big Finno-Ugric nation. One of its
concrete operational forms was to have active Estonian relations. The whole concept of a kindred spirit was in fact
created within Ylioppilaslehti. See Jukka Kortti, “Ylioppilaslehti and the University’s Language Struggle in the 1920’s
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The ethno-linguistic conflict was on the whole a significant national issue during the restless
childhood years of Finnish democracy. The conflict had great political importance, as it was directly
linked to the struggles among political parties, the position of Swedish speakers, and the rise of
nationalism and right-wing radicalism. It penetrated Finnish society extensively during the interwar
decades: the Swedishness of economic life was regarded as a far-reaching drawback; finnicizing the
army officers developed into an important point of controversy and all levels of education had to
take positions in this issue.
The great university student demonstration around the statue of J.V. Snellman on November 1928
became one of the crucial mass events in the University’s language struggle. As part of the
demonstration, a delegation of students delivered a petition about the University’s finnicization to
the Council of State, signed by ninety per cent of the student population of the University of
Helsinki. Ylioppilaslehti published, in connection with the petition, a special issue with, as its cover,
the appeal of the petition. The issue was written in a very declamatory style, appealing to history
from the very first line: “During those centuries, of which history knows to tell, the Finnish nation
has constantly lived under guardianship. … Each country’s greatness can be said to depend, for the
most part, on the abilities of its intelligentsia.”40 Besides, Ylioppilaslehti was an essential actor in
collecting the signatures of the petition.
The struggle continued during the entire decade of the 1930s. An additional parliamentary session
was suggested as a solution in January 1935. In the parliament, the handling of the language act was
delayed by filibustering – marathon speeches of nationalists, which were often written by university
and the 1930’s” Kasvatus ja aika, 3 (4) 2009, 7–73; Jukka Kortti, “Ylioppilaslehti and Estonia Before World War II” In
K. Alenius and A. Honkala & S. Wunsch, eds., On the Eastern Edge of the Baltic Sea II. Borders and Integration in the
History of the Fenno-Baltic Region, Studica Historica Septentrionalia 58, (Rovaniemi, 2009).
40 Ylioppilaslehti 21/1928, 409.
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students. The additional parliamentary session was not a success and the situation stood still for a
few years. A solution was reached only in 1937.
However, in the 1920s, there were opportunities for the AKS to organise among the cultural
intelligentsia. For instance, the main task of the group called Tulenkantajat (The Flame Bearers)
was to find a way to take Finland from the so-called “back woods” culture to the new, modern
European level of literature. One of the main critics of AKS and other radical right-wing groups
among the Finnish cultural intelligentsia during the 1930s was Matti Kurjensaari, who can be
described as an archetype of the French-type independent and “outsider” intellectual.41 The Finnish
minor Left intelligentsia of the 1930s, who had to operate mostly underground, heavily criticised
AKS. They did not, by the way, consider AKS members to be part of the intelligentsia, although
AKS was an academic movement. They wanted to separate the academic educated class from
intellectuals, who did not necessarily need any degrees or diplomas to be an intellectual. First of all,
an intellectual had to be in the vanguard of progress and outside the power elites. The main virtues
of an intellectual were intellectual integrity and the pursuit of truth and justice.
The University’s finnicization project was clearly an issue which penetrated the public’s
consciousness on a nationwide scale. The students’ idealism and politicising in Ylioppilaslehti had
reached the arenas of the public sphere at the national level even before the Second World War. It
was hoped that the paper might regain this role more or less in the same way, and partly with the
same people as before. The objectives of the right-wing students were reminiscent of what Jürgen
Habermas42 calls the public sphere of republican models of democracy.43 The republican tradition
41 Koivisto, ”Ihmisryhmä, jossa moraali ja äly yhtyvät”, 107–8. However, Tulenkantajat was not actually an opposition
for the AKS, because some of the intellectuals operated in both movements. Actually, the group disbanded partly due to
political conflicts, as some members ended up being strictly on the left while some openly promoted the values of AKS
in the 1930s.
42 Jürgen Habermas, “Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an
Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research”, Communication Theory 4 (2006),
411–26.
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stresses the political participation of active citizens. It is particularly interested in rational choice or
political ethos.
Many of the student activists of the 1920s, such as editor-in-chief of Ylioppilaslehti (1927–1928)
Urho Kekkonen, eventually became national politicians in the 1930s. Later, Kekkonen became the
8th president of Finland (1956–82). As a student publication, Ylioppilaslehti evoked a significant
response in the Finnish public sphere – a position which continued after the Second World War, but
in a different manner.
POST-WAR CULTIVATING OF HIGH CULTURE
After the Second World War, Ylioppilaslehti had to separate from the right-wing nationalistic tones
that had permeated the student activist movement before the war. The solution was to concentrate
on high culture. This was also the official state policy – a kind of mental war reparation agenda.
Ylioppilaslehti started to follow this idea in an organised way, and it soon became a major arena for
Finnish cultural criticism. Many of the most important Finnish authors, writers and critics
contributed to Ylioppilaslehti in the 1950s and 1960s, and many of the editors of the paper later
ended up in top positions in Finnish cultural institutions.
In the 1930s, underlining Finnish culture also involved rejecting other cultural influences and
closing the window to the breaths of the sprouting European modernism of the 1920s. After the
Second World War, in the so-called “second republic” of Finland, the political struggle concerned
the soul of the nation. In this clash, cultivating with high culture (art, literature, theatre, music,
43 Habermas also wants to make a distinction between this model and his criticised concept of the deliberative
democracy model, which was central to the concept of the normative public sphere in his dissertation. In short, the
deliberative democracy model is the formation of considered public opinions. It is interested in the epistemic function
of discourse and negotiation.
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architecture, and also film) played a big role. Despite the juxtapositions, a very literary liberal and
independent intelligentsia began to emerge in Finland in the 1950s. People were motivated by “an
immense hunger for culture” after the war. Basically, this applied to all of post-war Europe,
including the German student circles which experienced Hunger nach Kultur44.
The Communists who had been banned in Finland in the 1930s now resurfaced and regrouped
themselves. The intellectual Raoul Palmgren, former student activist of the radical social
democratic student organization ASS (the Academic Socialist Society) who mostly had formulated
the concepts of intelligentsia of the Left in the 1930s, became a major voice in defining the cultural
policy of the Left. Palmgren also composed the culture policy programme for the newly founded
Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL)45, which was the first of its kind in Finland. In
general, the leftist cultural views went through a formation period for some time after the war. They
believed that culture should become the property of the people as a whole, and that artists should be
supported financially by state grants and awards. A striking detail was the fact that Palmgren,
whose essay anthology46 was referring to Snellman and other Fennomen thinkers, emphasised
national culture while the Communist movement was otherwise striving to rid itself of the national
characteristics. Despite the fact that he wanted the working class to lead the way culturally,
Palmgren’s thinking was nevertheless based on the bourgeois notion of cultural Finnishness which
arose in the nineteenth century. His belief was, however, that the nationalism of the so-called “first
republic” of Finland (1919–1944) had corrupted the cultural Finnishness. Indeed, this modernist
44 Waldemar Krönig and Klaus-Dieter Müller, Nachkriegsemester. Studium in Kriegs- und Nachkrigzeit, 1990, quoted
from Laura Kolbe, Sivistyneistön rooli. Helsingin yliopiston ylioppilaskunta 1944–1959, (Helsinki, 1993), 320.
45 The Finnish People’s Democratic League was a political organisation with the aim of uniting the Finnish Left outside
the Finnish Social Democratic Party. The Finnish People’s Democratic League used to be one of the largest leftist
parties in Western Europe, with its main member party, the Communist Party of Finland, being one of the largest
communist parties west of the Iron Curtain.
46 Raoul Palmgren, Suuri linja. Arwidsonista vallankumouksellisiin sosialisteihin: kansallisia tutkielmia, (Helsinki,
1948).
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state-centred planning programme for science and culture became reality in the ensuing decades; in
1947, however, the traditionalist forces still prevailed.47
Palmgren as a “Finnish dissident” should be seen in the tradition of “Western Marxism” introduced
by Perry Anderson48, namely because he focused on cultural phenomena and “superstructure”
whilst the Finnish post-war communists emphasised economic and class struggle. Because of his
views, Palmgren’s political career ended in a split with the leadership of the Communist Party as
early as 1952.49
In the late 1930s, academic L.A. Puntila, who belonged to the middle generation of the AKS, had
already planned an extensive cultural/political programme, which he intended to be put into practice
through the University of Helsinki. The plan moved ahead during the Second World War when
Puntila, who served as the commander of the State Information Bureau during the war, was inspired
by the culture of the front lines, where the soldiers dwelled in dugouts and were surrounded by
entertainment. This experience strengthened his vision that cultural activities would flourish after
the war and its fruits ought to be gathered in the spirit of Snellmanian national revitalisation.
Naturally, students were best equipped for this task. The media was supposed to play a part in the
process – the press, publishers, and radio. As such, the foundation of Puntila’s vision was similar to
Palmgren’s: the educated classes, students, youth, and folk education inspired by the Fennoman
movement.
47 Allan Tiitta, Suomen Akatemian Historia I: 1948–1969. Huippuyksiköitä ja toimikuntia, (Helsinki, 2004), 56–7; Matti
Rinne, Kiila 1936–2006. Taidetta ja taistelua (Helsinki, 2006), 162–4.
48 Anderson, Perry, Considerations on Western Marxism (London 1976).
49 Ilkka Liikanen, “Raoul Palmgren and the East and West of the Finnish Left” in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-
Niemi, Jussi Vauhkonen (eds.) Multi-layered Historicity of the Present. Approaches to social science history (Helsinki
2013), 61-74.
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Even though the statue of Snellman, the Fennoman movement’s great man, was visited by the
Academic Socialist Society of left-wing students in 1945, it was the vision of Puntila which
emphasised the Snellman cult more in the spirit of the AKS. The aim of the AKS was to strengthen
Greater Finland, both externally and internally. Now it was time to build a “Mentally Greater
Finland.” Puntila worried about the possibility of student youth falling under the influence of the
People’s Democrats to realise this vision.50
As in Finnish society in general, the leftists did not manage to gain power among the university
intelligentsia after the post-war formation period. The post-war identity of Ylioppilaslehti, too, was
still anti-communist, although it did not embrace any particular political views. Rather, it was
balancing between different sides and avoided switching into any camps. Soon, the demands of
“student as citizen” thinking were expressed as well. Academic Federation for Freedom (VAL),
which in a way continued the anti-communist traditions of the AKS, specifically aimed to push
Ylioppilaslehti in a more “ideological” direction.51 According to the VAL, culture signified “Finnish
national culture,” and Ylioppilaslehti was defending a “travesty of a student,” who lived in an
ideological vacuum: “living in an organized society entails that the members of society adapt to
certain limits – individuality has its limits,” as the secretary of VAL wrote in early 1952. This
“warped individuality” presented itself, for example, in the idealization of “the ordinary student,”
from whom, in the spirit of the individualism advocated by Ylioppilaslehti, nothing could be
demanded.52 The VAL insisted, however, that students were needed in particular among the elite, as
the signpost that was formed by the educated classes.
50 Kolbe, Sivistyneistön rooli, 314–16.
51 The VAL was established in 1950, when it was possible to breathe more freely in Finland again. The nationalist
motives of the organization included not only anti-communism but also aspirations to push the arts out of the way of
politics in student activities.
52 Jussi Carpén, “Taistelu ylioppilaista”, Ylioppilaslehti 6/1952, 3; Kolbe, Sivistyneistön rooli, 366.
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It was evident that “individualists” referred to the new generation of modernist critics, whose
important forum turned out to be Ylioppilaslehti in the 1950s.53 On the whole, art criticism rose to
prominence in the 1950s. The poems and essays of the modernist aesthetics reached beyond the so-
called “birch bark culture” (ethnological national issues) of Finland, out into the international
currents. All in all, there were plenty of different debating groups and literary circles formed after
the war. The best known of these, the Eino Leino Society, was formed in 1947. It was named after
the great Finnish poet and included most of the critics contributing to Ylioppilaslehti in the 1950s.
After the left wing was no longer able to pose a threat to the cultural conservatives, a more
comfortable juxtaposition developed between the independent liberal cultural intelligentsia and the
conservatives.
Due to its pronounced cultural status, Ylioppilaslehti became an ever more significant actor within
the Finnish cultural community in the 1950s, and, in the process, also generated increasing visibility
for its ideas amongst the public at large. The cultural arena ranked high in the post-war hierarchy of
Finland’s public sphere. The cultural media, such as the cultural press, have been important public
institutions. Nonetheless, cultural magazines have often been marginalised and acted as counter- or
alternative public forums. The post-Second World War period was, however, exceptional in the
sense that, during that time, a “professional journal” like Ylioppilaslehti, managed to have an impact
on the entire public sphere at the national level. Of course, the paper has a relatively wide
circulation for a cultural publication, reaching not only students, but also a wide readership outside
of academia.54
53 For more about Ylioppilaslehti and the Finnish public sphere of the 1950s, see Jukka Kortti, “Building the New
Cultural Finland: the student magazine Ylioppilaslehti, the public sphere and the creation of the Finnish cultural elite in
the post-war era”, Scandinavian Journal of History, 36:4, (2011), 462–78.
54 The circulation numbers of the paper doubled in the 1950s, from approximately 10,000 to 20,000. At the same time,
the circulation of Finnish cultural periodicals peaked at a few thousand at the most. The circulation of Ylioppilaslehti
expanded even faster in the next decade, with a circulation of 60,000 in 1970, which equalled that of national
newspapers.
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But the young critics were by definition part of the historic legacy of the Finnish intelligentsia,
where intellectuals, despite their ostensible radicalism, were close to the Snellmanian nation-state –
or at least did not work outside of it as in southern Europe, for instance. This group of young
modernists, who later became the strong part of the national elite, certainly brought with their
modernism something new for Snellmanian ideology by breaking down and rebuilding the national
attributes. This was mainly done by restoring the idea of the fatherland and the language to the level
of private experiencing.55 Snellman (and German idealism) was there as with the Young Finns in
the early 20th century, but more in terms of individuality. Besides poetry and literature, the same
educational program was carried out by the film critics. Ylioppilaslehti had a central role in creating
a new intellectual cinema culture, which involved essayistic literature on cinema and cinema club
activities.
All in all, Ylioppilaslehti fits in with Habermas’ concept of the normative public sphere, because it
was about a deliberative and precisely bourgeois intelligentsia elite. Here it is also possible to
discern similarities with Habermas’s liberal model of democracy, as it reveals a preference for the
liberties of private citizens. It must be stressed, however, that Habermas’s notion is based above all
on the tradition of political liberalism, whereas the Finnish modernists of the 1950s stressed their
non-political nature. Indeed, for the most part, the modernism found in the pages of Ylioppilaslehti
of the 1950s dealt with culture. Still, the Finnish modernists embodied the European post-war
concept of an independent intellectual – although not as radical as Jean-Paul Sartre and others.
However, the situation changed in the late 1950s. Now it was time for politics again. But in the
context of the Cold War, the modernists did not rebel against the state, but started to line up behind
Urho Kekkonen, the President of Finland.
55 Auli Viikari, “Ei kenenkään maa. 1950-luvun tropologiaa”, in A. Makkonen, ed., Avoin ja suljettu. Kirjoituksia 1950-
luvusta suomalaisessa kulttuurissa (Helsinki, 1992), 72–4.
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THE RADICAL LEFT AND THE STATE
In the 1960s, Ylioppilaslehti sympathised more and more with the Left, which was due to the
changing demographics resulting from the flood of baby boomers into the universities. The
expansion of educational opportunities made higher education more common in industrialised
societies. The ideal of the normative public sphere that Ylioppilaslehti had followed so far was
challenged by the increased internationality brought on by the media, and especially television.
There were single-issue groups springing up, and the new left was raising its head. Modernity was
on the move and the public sphere started turning towards what Chantal Mouffe56 calls “agonistic
pluralism,” which is more receptive than the deliberative democracy model to the multiplicity of
voices that a pluralist society encompasses. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that this dialogue
was, and still is, governed by the elite.
The movements of the sixties were antiauthoritarian. This was also the case in Finland if you look at
the organizations the young Finnish intelligentsia established in the mid-1960s. Most of them, such
as the pacifist peace organisation Sadankomitea (The Committee of One Hundred) relied on non-
alignment thinking, albeit with close ties to the social democrats. Many of the activists studied
social and political sciences, fashionable modernist disciplines of the 1960s, but also medicine.
Before 1968, the Finnish student activism was mostly in the hands of liberal and left wing radicals.
But when the Western New Left started to build a “collective intellectual” – a framework
independent of party, state, and university57, the Finnish New Left took another direction. As in
56 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy on agonistic pluralism?” Social Research 66 (3), Fall 1999, 745–59.
57 Dick Flacks, “Making History and Making Theory. Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Relevance” in C. C. Lemert, ed.,
Intellectuals and Politics. Social Theory in a Changing World, 5 Key Issues in Sociological Theory, (Newbury Park,
CA, 1991), 17.
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Finnish society in general during the extremely rapid modernization process of the sixties58, the
student activists also had a strong belief in political parties, state politics, and the Scandinavian type
of social welfare policy. Another Finnish peculiarity in the context of international student activism
of the 1960s was the relation between the young intelligentsia and Finnish President Urho
Kekkonen. Kekkonen, a former student radical, became “the Great Master” of the Finnish 1960s
generation. While students in France and the U.S.A. bayed for their presidents to resign, the
President of Finland invited young radicals to wine and dine at his residence (famous, so called
“Children’s Parties”). Kekkonen also supported the most visible and soon-to-become mythical
Finnish action of 1968 — the occupation of the Old Student House in Helsinki.59
The Sixties was a “Revolution of the Intellectuals” as in 1848. It has been stated, that 1968 – “the
year of the barricades” and “the year that rocked the world”60 – was particularly a matter of the
collision of traditions and institutions. The old world, Bourgeoisie hegemony, a fashionable term in
1968, was challenged. Both sociologists and left-wing youth politicians used the term. The entire
decade of the 1960s was “the great age of Theory” as Tony Judt puts it. The Western new Left
exhumed the writings of Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci, and other forgotten
early-twentieth century Marxists, who were accompanied by the rediscovery of Marx himself.  61
But unlike in other Western countries, the Finnish intelligentsia for the most part chose the “old”
Marx of Lenin after 1968: authorized democratic centralism and proletarian dictatorship. And the
master was particularly Lenin, not Trotsky or Mao, as in most other radical movements in the West
during the time. So-called Taistoism was a Finnish version of the Stalinistic, orthodox communist
58 Finland’s economic growth in the postwar period was extraordinary. The average annual rate of real national product
growth by country was 5 percent in Finland in the 1960s and, for instance, about 3.3 percent in Sweden, Denmark and
Norway during the same period.
59 About the year 1968 in Finland, see Laura Kolbe “From Memory to History: Year 1968 in Finland” Scandinavian
Journal of History 4/2008, 366–81.
60 David Caute, Sixty-Eight: The Year of the Barricades, (London, 1988); Kurlansky, 1968.
61 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York, 2005), 398, 403, 407.
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movement in the 1970s, which started to take shape after the Soviet Union occupation of
Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This was a turning point, after the radical left turned pro-Soviet.
Another remarkable feature compared to other Western extreme left wing movements of the time,
was that Taistoists joined the political party (The Communist Party of Finland SKP) right from the
beginning. Although the Taistoists never had a majority anywhere – not even in SKP in which more
of a Euro-communist faction had a majority – they had an influence on the Finnish public sphere,
since they were a small but vocal minority among the cultural and academic elite, and they had a
powerful ally, the Soviet Union, who had a habit of getting involved in Finnish internal affairs.
Why the most progressive faction of the Finnish academic youth turned to the Leninist student
movement in the 1970s is a major (and still comprehensively unstudied) phenomenon in the history
of Finland.62 This is, however, not the proper forum for analysing the topic thoroughly either, but in
the context of the history of the Finnish intelligentsia, the activism of this movement is interesting.
AKS can be seen as a predecessor of the Taistoists, although the former comes from the extreme
right and the latter from the extreme left. Besides, the fact that both movements arose from the
deteriorating expectations for the academics in the future (the weakening of social positions, jobs
and salaries) they both leaned on the “people” that they considered the hard-working core of
society. AKS nationalists identified, in the context of the Fennoman movement, with the traditional
peasantry, whereas Leninists gravitated to the ranks of the working class.63 According to social
scientist Matti Virtanen, who had studied Finnish societal generations, the new left movement and
its radicalisation went through different phases, but actually originated from within the Fennoman
movement, although it was actualised differently. On the other hand, the historian of the Student
62 About the ideological themes of the movement and the reasons behind the drastic turn, see Jukka Relander, “From
Flowers To Steel. Development of the Leninist Mind in Finland 1968–1972”, Scandinavian Journal of History, 33(4)
2008, 464–477.
63 Jukka Relander, “From Flowers to Steel. Development of the Leninist Mind in Finland 1968–1972” Scandinavian
Journal of History 4/2008, 467.
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Union of the University of Helsinki Laura Kolbe emphasises that 1968 represented first and
foremost the break with a long patriotic tradition.64
It is true that the same Snellman can be found in the writings of the academic Leninists. They
adopted the original Western Humboldtian ideals65 of higher education.66 This was expressed in the
1970 pamphlet Johdatus uuteen yliopistoon67 (Introduction to the New University). The pamphlet
was linked to the university administrative reform of the time and demanded democratic, free
Humboldtian University ideals instead of the technocratic monopoly and capitalistic politics of
higher learning: Bildung durch Wissenschaft. The most interesting article in the pamphlet is that by
Kari Toikka, in which he connects the Leftist lines and Snellmanian university ideals: the unity of
science, research and teaching, and the freedom of teaching and studying: “The division of
defenders and demoralisers of the university as a consequence of ahistorical definitions of
university circumstances is ideological and false – especially when professors and students are
pitted against each other as different groups.”68 Toikka later noted that through Snellman, they
easily got their hands on the classical university idea. He thought that it was “a funny accident” that
Snellman spoke very simply about the same ideas they had, and the topic was linked to the Finnish
university tradition.69 In addition, the academic Taoistoists rediscovered the essays by Raoul
Palmgren from the 1940s in the 1970s.
Although President Kekkonen began to keep the radical left at arm’s length in the 1970s, the
radicals and Kekkonen shared a common enemy — old school conservative patriots in the
64 Matti Virtanen, Fennomanian perilliset: poliittiset traditiot ja sukupolvien dynamiikka (Helsinki, 2001), 380-381;
Laura Kolbe, Eliitti, traditio ja murros. Helsingin yliopiston ylioppilaskunta 1960–1990 (Helsinki, 1996), 10–11.
65 E.g. Sylvia Paletschek, “DieErfindung der Humboldtschen Universität. Die Konstruktion der deutschen
Universitätsidee in der erste Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts,” Historische Anthropologie 10(2002), 183–205.
66 Kolbe, “From Memory to History”, 375.
67 Pekka Aarnio and Mikael Böök and Antti Kasvio and Kari Toikka and Matti Viikari, Johdatus uuteen yliopistoon
(Helsinki, 1970).
68 Kari Toikka “Akateeminen kasvastus ja akateeminen vapaus” in P. Aarnio and M. Böök & A. Kasvio & K. Toikka &
M. Viikari, Johdatus uuteen yliopistoon (Helsinki, 1970), 133.
69 Veikko Koivusalo and Timo Kallinen, ed., Pitkä 70-luku. Valokuvia ja muistikuvia (Helsinki, 2000), 177.
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university, but also in foreign politics. The relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were
crucial for Finland in many ways; not just in foreign politics, but also in economic, domestic, and
cultural policy. The early 1970s in particular were difficult times for these relations, and Kekkonen
did everything necessary to weaken the influence of conservative dissenters. On the other hand, the
Taistoists were the first ones to contribute to the political “peace and friendship” between the Soviet
Union and Finland, which was called Finlandizierung70 (Finlandisation). However, cringing and
toadying to Russians consumed the entire Finnish political sphere in the 1970s, excluding minority
right wing and populist factions. As in the policies of Fennomen in the era of the Grand Duchy in
the nineteenth century, the relations with the eastern power were important. All in all, the principal
themes of the Fennoman movement can be found in the activities of Taistoists: loyalty to Russians,
the strong state, and the importance of education. Although the frame of reference for “the people”
was different, Snellman was still there.
CONCLUSION: INTELLIGENTSIA, THE (WELFARE) STATE, AND POSTMODERN
CHALLENGES
Although we would strictly consider intellectuals to be individuals apart from the dominant culture,
the place of the intellectual in the society can be neither inherently contradictory nor abusive. His or
her role lies in the capacity to assume responsibility and move away from interpreting the society
from a particular ideological dogma. And this is particularly true for the new nations.71 But Finland
can be seen as a special case even in this context. The national vocation has fettered public debate
in Finland: the contribution of the academic elite to nation-making was, in Finland, even more
70 The term, still controversial among the Finnish historians, was used to describe the influence of a powerful country
on the policies of a smaller neighbouring country. It is originated in West German political debate, chiefly by Franz
Josef Strauss, in the late 1960s and 1970s. See e.g. David Kirby, A Concice History of Finland. (Cambridge, 2006),
245-246, 267.
71 Lipset & Basu, ”The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals”, 144.
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significant than in Europe’s other new nations, and the professors were subject first and foremost to
the state.72
Now the crucial question arises: is this a problem? What harm could the close link between
intellectuals and the state do to a country? One could claim that the strong state has colonized the
civil society. This argument refers to the fact that Nordic countries in general have been seen as
corporatist societies and therefore, at least from an Anglo-American view, could be seen as
promoting a narrowing of the liberal civil society. But as German historian Norbert Götz73 has
pointed out, the matter of civic involvement in state affairs has been just as important as the
question of the state’s autonomy. The relationship between the state and civil society is not simply
contradictory, and we must take into consideration the complex intellectual and political traditions
of the Nordic countries. One important factor in Nordic history is the relatively strong tradition of
the so-called popular movements (Protestant revivalists, the temperance movement, the agricultural
movement, and the labour movement, as well as sports, language, and women’s organizations) with
their associations which could be seen as part of the civil society.
Social movements are places where legitimate intellectual labourers can seek and gain recognition
in new arenas. They are also places where intellectuals can be made.74 The movements have been
relatively autonomous in the Nordic countries. However, this does not actually apply to Finland,
which has experienced a marked tradition of state control over civil society by the detailed Finnish
Law on Associations that requires official registration. Although student activism as the genesis of
“movement intellectuals,” especially in the 1960s, has often been seen as an attempt to question the
72 Klaus Mäkelä: ‘Kansallinen kutsumus on kahlinnut kansalaiskeskustelua’ Helsingin Sanomat, December 24, 1988
quoted from Katarina Eskola “Women and the Media-related Intellectual Public Sphere”, in Niilo Kauppi & Pekka
Sulkunen (eds.) Vanguard of Modernity. Society, Intellectuals, and the University,Publications of the research unit for
contemporary culture 32, Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 150.
73 Norbert Götz, “Century of Corporatism of Century of Civil Society? The Northern European Experience”, in Norbert
Götz & Jörg Hackmann (eds.) Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region. (Hampshire & Burlington, 2003), 37-48.
74 Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics, 11.
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power structures, the link between the Finnish student elite and the state has also remained strong in
the latter part of the 20th century.
In the Finnish case, Götz75 refers to the fact that the establishment of stable corporatist structures in
the labour market did not succeed before the late 1960s. For me, the historical background for this
Finnish peculiarity in the Nordic context, which could be seen as problematic against the idea of
civil society, is the legacy of the bloody Finnish Civil War and the geopolitical situation of Finland.
However, the histories of Nordic welfare states include three different ideological elements: the
idealised heritage of the free independent peasants, the spirit of capitalism, and the utopia of
socialism. To achieve this goal of the welfare state, the process has demanded not only state-
centrism but wide consensus, involving collective agreements among different political parties.76
Although the process was extraordinarily rapid from the 1960s to the 1980s, Finland was a
latecomer among Nordic countries in building its welfare state, yet one can still find all the
ideologies within the intellectual activism discussed above. The “Nordic corporatist model” has
meant the building of welfare states with certain social policies (public social services, etc.) but it
has also affected all institutions, including media77 – and universities.
Besides the Nordic context, Finnish intellectual history – in fact all history – must be seen in
relation to Russia, and later, the Soviet Union. As the Finnish history sociologist Risto Alapuro78
has stated, the Finnish intelligentsia has lived “in the shadow of Russia.” Most of the time it has
meant that the “state intellectuals” have been forced to cope with the neighbouring super power.
75 Götz, “Century of Corporatism of Century of Civil Society?”, 45.
76 Pauli Kettunen, “The Tension between the Social and the Economic – A Historical Perspective of a Welfare State” in
Jari Ojala & Jari Eloranta & Jukka Jalava, The Road to Prosperity. An Economic Hiastory of Finland (Helsinki, 2006)
285-313.
77 About the “Democratic Corporatist Model” in Media Systems see Daniel C. Hallin & Paolo Mancini, Comparing
Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics (Cambridge, 2004), 73–75.
78 Alapuro, Suomen älymystö Venäjän varjossa.
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There are periods when the Finnish intelligentsia have had an opportunity to question the Russian
rule during its turmoil on one hand, as well as to blindly obey its politics on the other. Nevertheless,
they have never really given up the Snellmanian ideas of the State and Bildung.
Then, according to Snellmanian thinking, should we talk about the “educated class” (in Finnish
sivistyneistö, in German Bildungsbürgertum, and in French classe cultivée) rather than
“intellectuals” or “intelligentsia?” Although many languages make a distinction between the two,
they are often mixed. It is obvious that habitually what we call intellectuals are actually “intellectual
labour,” although intellectuals are not a class in the economic sense, but a social category, or
perhaps a social stratum.
East-German poet and author Rainer Kirsch expressed to a Finnish journalist recently, that
“intellectual” was a curse word in the DDR.79 In a way, the same situation has existed in Finland
since the 1970s, when the Finnish intelligentsia started to lose its significance. When the national
public sphere meant first and foremost the bourgeois public sphere (Bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit) for
the radical left, the large group of Finnish intelligentsia retreated to write to each other in their own
community. That is why none of the young intellectuals could achieve the independent role of a
“public” intellectual.80 There are two historical paradoxes in this development. When the left finally
occupied the Finnish intelligentsia, its importance diminished. On the other hand, when the Finnish
political atmosphere started to be released from the “Finlandisation” in the post-Kekkonen era in the
1980s, the new times questioned the whole idea of an intellectual.
It is not a coincidence that this development is parallel to the importance of Ylioppilaslehti in the
Finnish public sphere. In the 1980s, the essentials for the existence of the intelligentsia had changed
79 Radio programme “Berliini – taiteilijakuvia jaetusta kaupungista”, part 1, Historiasarjoja. YLE Radio 1. Jenni
Stammeier. September 29, 2010.
80 Matti Hyvärinen, Viimeiset taistot. Taistolainen opiskelijaliike, kertomus ja retoriikka (Tampere, 1994), 333.
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along with the institutionalisation of the university system and changes in media. The rising of
postmodernism impugned and even ridiculed the whole idea of a Finnish intellectual. For
intellectuals of postmodern times, it has been typical that they readily present categorical truths
about the diminishing significance of the intelligentsia, and thereby undermine the validity of their
own argument81.
This became evident in 1989, for instance, when Finnish sociologists organized an inquiry in
collaboration with cultural editors of the leading Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat about who
is who in the Finnish intelligentsia. The original idea and pattern for the research came from the
French review Lire from 1981 and French sociologist Pierre Bourdius’s critique of it. One of the
findings of the research was that a typical Finnish intellectual is employed by the state (including
the university) or financed by a government grant. As the sociologists who conducted the research
noted:
The specific feature of Finnish intellectual has, for historical reasons, been their dependency on the state. The
connection between the university and politics has been very close. Now this connection has become less thin, but
especially between academic intellectuals and the state, the connection is still a close one.82
In fact, the critique by Erno Paasilinna mentioned in the introduction was based on these inquiry
results. It seems that this strong link between the intelligentsia and the state in Finland makes the
idea of a Finnish intellectual an easy target, not only for ironic and sarcastic columnists, but for the
“common people” as well. The latest debate on the topic, with statements such as “there are no real
intellectuals in Finland” occurred in the Finnish public sphere when the former Prime Minister
81 See Pasi Saukkonen, Pasi “Intellekuaalinen rooli ja kansallinen identiteetti”, in Pertti Karkama & Hanne Koivisto,
eds., Älymystön jäljillä. Kirjoituksia suomalaisesta sivistyneistöstä ja älymystöstä. Tietolipas 151, (Helsinki, 1997),
332–47.
82 Keijo Rahkonen and J. P. Roos , ’The Field of Intellectuals: The Case of Finland’,  in Kauppi & Pekka Sulkunen
(eds.) Vanguard of Modernity. Society, Intellectuals, and the University, Publications of the research unit for
contemporary culture 32 (University of Jyväskylä, 1992), 122.
34
Paavo Lipponen listed the Finnish intellectuals in his book on Bildung published in 200883. The
debate triggered several sarcastic comments. Again, it was not easy to be a Finnish intellectual
because your existence was questioned.
Another, more universal threat to the intellectual culture is the rise of technocracy, which is
embedded in the current international university reforms. There are signs recalling the post-Second
World War controversy of “the two cultures.”84 The conflict between humanities and “hard
sciences” seems to rear its head during the university reforms. When the long running Finnish
degree reform85 – including the American-style system of measuring studies in credit points –
finally came to an end in the early 1980s, the university historian and humanist Matti Klinge86
emphasised that the society should understand the disadvantages of educating students only to a job:
“If we will have an uncritical intelligentsia around the year 2000, the democracy is in danger.”
Despite a few Finnish intellectual dissidents, the vision has come true in the 2000s, although,
looking back on the history of the Finnish intelligentsia, there has never really been an intellectual
stratum opposed to the state. However, if universities are seen only in terms of efficiency,
commerce, and (technological) innovation, the critical intelligentsia is in danger of becoming
extinct — not only in Finland, but in all of the Western world.
83 Paavo Lipponen, Järki voittaa. Suomalainen identiteetti globalisaation aikakaudella (Helsinki, 2008).
84 The most famous example of the dispute is from the early 1960s, when the British intellectuals; scientist-turned-
novelist C.P. Snow and literary critic F.R. Leavis had a public intellectual conflict between competing visions of
Britain’s past, present, and future (see e.g. Guy Ortolano, The Two Cultures Contorversy. Science, Literature and
Cultural Politics in Postwar Britain (Campbridge, 2009). However, the dispute between arts and sciences could be
found in other parts of post war Europe as well, such as Finland in the 1950s.
85 The degree reform was a part of the emergence of modern Western science policy created in the late 1950s and the
early 1960s. A “system of higher education” paralleled a new conception of science as a productive power, contributing
to economic growth as well as to the knowledge base. This conception was closely related to the heightened importance
of applied science and technology as a means of boosting productivity and competitiveness in the world shadowed by
the Cold War. (Marja Jalava, “Cultural Revolution or Bureaucratic Jargon: The Finnish Degree Reform of the 1970s”,
A paper presented at the European Social Science History Conference ESSHC 2008.)
86 Kimmo Henriksson, “Professori Matti Klinge: Kurssimainen opiskelu näivettää” Helsingin Sanomat 13.2.1983.
